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Each year U.S. farmers receive more subsidies than needy families receive 
through welfare assistance or post-secondary students receive through student aid 
grants. Yet, who benefits from agricultural subsidies is an open question.   
Economic theory predicts the entire subsidy incidence should be on the farmland 
owners. Since non-farmers own nearly half of all farmland, this implies that a 
substantial portion of all subsidies accrue to non-farmers while a significant share 
of all farmers receive no benefits. Using a complementary set of policy quasi-
experiments, I find that farmers who rent the land they cultivate capture 75 
percent of the subsidy, leaving just 25 percent for landowners.  This finding 
contradicts the prediction from neoclassical models.    The standard prediction 
may not hold due to less than perfect competition in the farmland rental market; 
the share captured by landowners increases with local measures of 
competitiveness in the farmland rental market. 
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1   Introduction 
 
The primary goal of U.S. agricultural policy over the past century has been to increase 
farmers’ income.  Since 1973, direct payments to agricultural producers have been a vital 
instrument for supporting that goal.
1  Whether agricultural subsidies actually benefit farmers, 
however, is an open question.  Non-farmers, individuals who do not currently farm any land, own 
and rent out nearly half of all farmland in the United States.  Standard economic theory predicts that 
subsidies accrue entirely to land owners.  Agricultural subsidies may not benefit farmers if non-
farmer landlords are able to adjust rental rates to capture the subsidies paid to agricultural 
producers.  
  In the United States, agricultural subsidies are a significant transfer program.  Between 1998 
and 2004, farmers received, on average, $17 billion annually.  In comparison, federal Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families grants averaged $13.6 billion, while federal aid to post-secondary 
students averaged $16.1 billion.  On a per-recipient basis, agricultural subsidies are one of the 
largest income support policies.  In 2002, the average farm subsidy recipient received $6,947.   
Compare this to $1,730 annually per recipient household in food stamps; an average total 
unemployment compensation claim of $4,369; or $6,540 per eligible individual in annual benefits 
from SSI, an income support for the needy aged, blind, and disabled.  The size of the farm subsidy 
program alone emphasizes the importance of understanding whether the stated policy goals are 
being met. 
  The standard model of agricultural subsidy incidence predicts that, due to the extremely 
inelastic supply of agricultural land, landowners receive the entire benefit of the subsidy.  This 
model is widely used by economists to explain the effects of agricultural subsidies (e.g., Shultze, 
                                                 
1 See Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe (1997) for a history of agricultural policy.   3
1971; Schmitz and Just, 2002).
2  According to this model, non-farmers, who own 94 percent of 
rented farmland and 42 percent of all U.S. farmland, reap a substantial share of the benefits from 
agricultural subsidies. 
  Surprisingly little evidence substantiates this model.  In spite of a large literature examining 
the capitalization of subsidies into farmland values, the proportion of the marginal subsidy dollar 
captured by landowners remains unknown.  Rosine and Helmberger (1974) attempt to address this 
question by simulating producer surplus with and without agricultural policy.  They conclude that 
92 cents of every dollar generated by farm programs accrues to the landlord.  However, 
fundamental aspects of their simulation model have been questioned (Gisser, 1993; Alston and 
James, 2002), and modern farm programs, which began in 1973, differ from those examined by 
Rosine and Helmberger.  Instead of estimating the subsidy incidence, the previous literature 
typically assumes full incidence on land and estimates either the elasticity of land value with respect 
to subsidies (Traill, 1982; Goodwin and Ortalo-Magne, 1992), the rate at which future subsidies are 
discounted (Weersink, et al., 1999; Lamb and Henderson, 2004), or the proportion of land value 
attributable to subsidies (Featherstone and Baker, 1988; Herriges, et al., 1992).   
In contrast, I directly investigate the incidence of agricultural subsidies by examining the 
response of farmland rental rates and tenants’ net returns to exogenous agricultural subsidy changes 
while accounting for several potential sources of bias (see Roberts et al., 2003, for early work in this 
area).  By law, farm operators receive the subsidy directly.  Under cash lease arrangements, tenants 
receive the subsidy check; landlords extract the subsidy to the extent that rental rates rise with the 
subsidy.  Thus, landlord and tenant incidence are measured by the extent to which rental rates and 
net operating returns, respectively, rise with the marginal subsidy dollar.  In this paper I test the 
                                                 
2 Gardner, speaking before the House Committee on Agriculture in February, 2001 stated, “…one of the things I think is 
fairly well-agreed upon that [subsidy] programs do is that the way in which they affect farmers’ income is not through 
everything that happens on the farm, but in the particular way of holding up land values and land rental rates.”   4
standard theory that landlords capture the full subsidy by testing whether rental rates rise dollar-for-
dollar with subsidies and whether subsidies do not affect tenants’ net returns.    
As per-period prices, farmland rental rates respond primarily to innovations in expected 
returns in the current period, including exogenous policy-induced subsidy changes.  Three policy 
changes provide the exogenous subsidy variation this paper uses to estimate the landlord-tenant 
division of the subsidy dollar.  First, the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform 
(FAIR) Act altered the relative subsidy rate among crops, resulting in subsidy variation due to 
historic crop choice rather than current behavior.  Next, emergency legislation in 1998 and 1999 
provide largely unanticipated subsidy changes with which to investigate the subsidy’s immediate 
effect.  Finally, the relative policy stability in the years following the 2002 Farm Security and Rural 
Investment (FSRI) Act set the stage to estimate the medium to long-run effect of exogenous subsidy 
changes on rental rates and net returns. 
Even in this setting, where subsidy variation is plausibly unrelated to farmer behavior, 
unobserved characteristics of the farm may influence both subsidies and rental rates. Using farm-
level data from the 1992 and 1997 Census of Agriculture, the 1999 Agricultural Economics and 
Land Ownership Survey, and the 2005 Agricultural Resource Management Survey, I control for 
unobserved heterogeneity with farm fixed effects.  This is a particularly credible setting for fixed 
effects because of time-invariant ‘farm-quality’ factors that affect subsidies, net returns, and rental 
rates.
3  
Another source of bias may arise when the relevant subsidy measure, the expected subsidy 
when rental rates are set, is unavailable to the analyst.  Prior to the 1996 FAIR Act, subsidy rates 
depended on post-harvest commodity prices, which were unknown when rental agreements were 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, Hoch (1958, 1962) and Mundlak (1961) developed the fixed effects estimator in the context of 
unobserved farm quality.   5
made in the spring. The difference between the realized subsidy used in the analysis and the 
expected subsidy considered when setting rental rates, i.e., the “expectation error,” results in 
measurement error-style attenuation bias.  The FAIR Act solves this problem by divorcing subsidies 
from commodity prices, making subsidies knowable by tenants and landlords when setting rental 
rates.  I use the post-FAIR Act subsidy as an instrumental variable to address the expectation error 
problem.  
Contrary to the standard model’s predictions, this paper finds that only 20 to 25 cents of the 
marginal subsidy dollar are reflected in increased rental rates, whereas tenant net returns rise by 70 
to 75 cents.  Accounting for nearly the full subsidy dollar with these two largely independent 
estimates provides confidence in an approximately 25/75 landlord-tenant split of the marginal 
subsidy dollar. 
Although previous research assumed full subsidy incidence on the landowner, characteristics 
of the farmland market, such as imperfect competition and social norms, suggest why this may not 
be the case.  Farm consolidation and growth results in fewer tenants who may enjoy increasing 
market power in the farmland rental market.  Landlords, who forgo the use value of the land without 
a tenant, may implicitly share the subsidy to attract tenants.  I test this possibility using measures of 
rental market concentration and demonstrate that the landlord’s incidence increases when the rental 
market becomes more competitive.  Social norms and fairness also might play an important role in 
the division of the subsidy dollar.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 details the institutional facts about the farmland 
rental market and subsidy policy.  Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 lays out the empirical 
strategy employed in this investigation, emphasizing the identifying assumptions.  Section 5 
presents the incidence on landlords and tenants and provides evidence of the robustness of the   6
estimated incidence.  Section 6 explores the short and long-run incidence. Section 7 examines 
possible explanations for the findings, and section 8 concludes. 
2   Institutional Background 
2.1  Overview of the farmland rental market 
 
  Renting farmland is a common practice in U.S. agriculture, where more than 45 percent of 
the 917-million farmland acres are rented (USDA 2001b).  A typical tenant rents 65 percent of the 
land he farms, paying either in cash or in shares of production.  According to the 1999 Agricultural 
Economics and Land Ownership Survey (AELOS),
4 60 percent of rented farmland is paid in cash, 
24 percent in shares of production, and 11 percent in a cash/share combination.  In 1999, the 
average cash-rented acre went for $32.  Subsidy recipients paid a slightly higher $36 per acre for the 
land they cash rented.  In the United States, non-farmers own 94 percent of the rented land, or 340 
million acres—twice the size of Texas (USDA, NASS 2001b).  The parties enter into the rental 
agreements early in the year, typically by March 1
st.   
2.2  Agricultural Subsidy Policy 
 
  The decade from 1992 – 2002 saw three major agricultural subsidy policy changes, each 
providing a quasi-experiment that can be used to evaluate the incidence of agricultural subsidies.  
Subsidies were calculated in a broadly consistent way throughout this period.  Farm i’s total subsidy 
for crop k in year t, subsidyikt, equaled  
(1)     subsidyikt =δkty  ik,1985biktskt,   
                                                 
4 The Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Survey is a follow-up survey to the Census of Agriculture 
conducted every 10 years.  This survey asks questions of both tenants and land owners.   7
where δkt is a scaling factor; the program yield,  y  ik,1985, is a farm-specific parameter that equals the 
average production yield for crop k on farm i between 1980 – 1984;
5  bikt  is the number of acres of 
crop k on farm i qualifying for a subsidy, called base acres, that participate in the subsidy program 
in year t; skt denotes the national subsidy rate for crop k in year t.  It is important to note that the 
subsidy is paid to the farm operator, and the program yield and program qualification are 
specifically tied to an acre of land.  As an acre changes ownership or receives new tenants, these 
parameters stay with the land, and the new operator receives the subsidy.  As such, agricultural 
subsidies are factor-specific subsidies to land. 
A.  The Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 
  The 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act was the first, and most 
significant, policy change during this decade.  The FAIR Act changed relative subsidy rates, 
effectively redistributing subsidies according to the crop historically grown on the farm.
6  It also 
divorced subsidies from commodity prices and established a seven-year schedule to phase out 
agricultural subsidies.  Subsidies are paid to the farm operator after the harvest.  Prior to 1996, the 
national subsidy rate depended on the commodity’s price after harvest, i.e., skt = sp kt () .  When 
negotiating rental contracts in the spring, farmers and landlords knew the program yield and base 
acres associated with the rental property, but they were uncertain of the subsidy rate.  Hence, the 
rental rate was set conditional on the expected subsidy.  Under the FAIR Act, the entire subsidy 
associated with the land was known in the spring, and rental rates could be set conditional on the 
actual subsidy. 
B.  Emergency subsidy legislation of 1998, 1999, and 2000 
                                                 
5 The exact calculation dropped the highest and lowest yields and averaged yields from the 3 remaining years. 
6 For example, in 1997 the subsidy rate for wheat, skt in equation (1), nearly equaled the 1990-1995 average subsidy 
rate, i.e., 63 cents versus 65 cents.  The 1997 subsidy rate for corn, however, was substantially higher than its 1990-
1995 average, i.e., 49 cents versus 30 cents.   8
  The second quasi-experiment that provides exogenous subsidy variation is a set of three 
“emergency” policy changes between fall 1998 and summer 2000, which were passed in response to 
dramatically falling commodity prices.  The first of these policies unexpectedly increased 1998 
subsidies by 50 percent.
7  Subsequently, the 1999 and 2000 legislation doubled subsidies.  In terms 
of equation (1), these policies affected the scaling factor δikt.  The analysis below focuses on the 
impact of subsidies in 1999, the first year farmers could have expected additional subsidies in the 
face of low commodity prices.  This policy change also provides the opportunity to capture the 
immediate effect of unanticipated subsidies. 
 C. The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 
The Farm Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act of 2002 provides the final quasi-
experiment of the 1992 – 2002 period.  Signed into law in May 2002, the FSRI Act replaced the 
FAIR Act, which was set to expire at the end of 2002.  Earlier in the spring of 2002, when rental 
rates were agreed upon and planting decisions were made, the FAIR Act was in effect while 
Congress worked to reconcile the Senate version of the bill, which called for reduced subsidies, 
with the House version, which called for subsidy increases.  Ultimately, FSRI increased subsidies 
and was made retroactive to cover the 2002 crop year.  In this climate of uncertainty, 2002 may best 
be considered a policy transition year rather than a new policy regime.  FSRI did, however, usher in 
a period of policy stability; subsidy policy remained virtually unchanged from 2002 through 2008.  
I utilize this time of policy stability in the analysis below to investigate the medium to long-run 
subsidy incidence. 
                                                 
7 On September 21, 1998 the U.S. Senate introduced language into the fiscal year 1999 agriculture appropriations bill 
calling for dramatic subsidy increases.  By Thanksgiving 1998, farmers received checks that increased their 1998 
subsidy by 50 percent.   9
3   Data 
The primary data source is the U.S. Census of Agriculture, a quinquennial census of those 
who produce at least $1,000 of agricultural goods.
8  The Census of Agriculture contains farm-level 
production information, information on the corporate structure of the operation, and demographic 
information on the primary operator.  In addition, the Census employs a stratified sampling 
procedure to select a subset of farms from which it collects detailed financial information, such as 
variable expenditures, land values, and revenue.
9  
3.1   Sample Creation 
  In the main analysis I use two years of the Census of Agriculture, 1992 and 1997, to create a 
balanced panel of farming operations.  Each year, roughly 1.6 million farms respond to the Census.  
About one million farms are observed in consecutive census years, and approximately three-
quarters of these farms grow a subsidized crop in either year.  The first two columns of table 1 
contain the summary statistics for the population of farms that grow subsidized crops.    
Nearly half of farms growing subsidized crops cash rent some land.  The summary statistics 
reported in table 1 columns 3 and 4 reveal that cash-renting farms are slightly larger and more 
profitable than the average farm.  In 1992, cash-renting farms were 200 acres larger (about 30 
percent) on average and earned on average $4 more per acre (about 7 percent) in net returns.  Cash 
renters were also more likely to receive subsidies (64 percent versus 55 percent) and received a 50-
cent higher subsidy per acre than the average farm in 1992 ($16.22 versus $15.73).   
                                                 
8 These data are confidential micro files accessed under an agreement with the USDA Economic Research Service and 
the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS).  The data are available at NASS in Washington, DC.  Any 
interpretations and conclusions derived from the data represent the author’s views and not necessarily those of NASS. 
9 Farms are stratified based on expected revenue.  All farms with very high expected revenue are selected, and 
approximately one-in-four of all other farms also receive the Census’ long form.  I use Census-provided sample weights 
when appropriate to account for this sample composition.   10
I construct the sample for the final analysis by limiting the sample to farms that report 
paying cash rent in both years.
10  The summary statistics of the final analysis sample, contained in 
the last two columns of table 1, reveal that the final analysis sample is representative of the 
population of cash renters.  The only substantial difference between the population of cash renters 
and my sample is in the mean rental rate, reflecting the presence of large outliers in the population; 
note that the median rental rates, reported in brackets, are very similar between the sample and the 
population.  The final analysis sample consists of 59,934 farms observed over two years. 
Sample Selection Bias 
  Farms used in the final analysis reported paying cash rent in both 1992 and 1997.  This 
poses a problem if the propensity to rent farmland in 1997 is influence by the 1996 policy change.  
For example, this source of endogeneity could bias the incidence estimate downward if farms 
experiencing a high subsidy pass-through stopped renting, but those experiencing low rental-rate 
incidence continue to rent.  I investigate the potential sample selection bias using a Heckman 
selection model. The first stage includes both characteristics of the land and characteristics of the 
farmer, such as age and principal occupation, which likely influence the propensity to rent land.
11  
The second stage excludes the demographic characteristics of the farmer.  Although the farmer’s 
characteristics likely influence the decision to rent, the rental rate is primarily determined by the 
characteristics of the land.  The results of this analysis are reported in appendix table 1.  Based on 
the exclusion restrictions, the likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the error 
                                                 
10 All variables are winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile to limit the influence of outliers.  Non-negative variables are 
only winsorized at the 99
th percentile. 
11
 The demographic covariates are as follows: whether the farm is a family farm, whether it is a partnership, whether 
the farmer resides on the farm, whether farming is the principal occupation, number of days worked off farm, farming 
experience, experience squared, age, age squared, race.   11
terms from the selection and regression equations are uncorrelated.
12 The propensity to cash rent in 
both years appears unrelated to the subsidy.  Furthermore, the incidence estimate remains the same 
as the values reported below, demonstrating its robustness to this specification.   
3.2   Variable Creation 
A.  Dependent Variable 
  The Census of Agriculture does not report the per-acre rental rate, however respondents do 
report the total amount paid in cash rent.  The total acres rented on a cash, share, or free basis also 
are reported.  From these two variables, I create the per-acre rental rate by dividing total cash rent 
by total acres rented.  Admittedly, the resulting rental rate will be too small for farms that cash rent 
part of the land and share rent another part.
13 As long as this measurement error in the dependent 
variable is uncorrelated with the regressors, only the intercept will be confounded.  However, if the 
measurement error is correlated with the magnitude of government payments, the estimated effect 
of government payments on rental rates will be biased.  Evidence from the 1999 Agricultural 
Economics and Land Ownership Survey (AELOS) demonstrates that if a bias exists, it is likely to 
be slightly positive.
14 
B.  Independent Variables 
The subsidy variable is constructed from the reported government payments variables.   
Every agricultural producer is asked to report the "total amount received for participation in federal 
                                                 
12 The chi-squared statistic equals 0.11, with a p-value of 0.73.  In the two-step procedure, the coefficient on the inverse-
Mills ratio is -1.07 with a standard error of 2.58.  Details available in appendix table 1. 
13 According to the 1999 AELOS, 17.5 percent of farms that rent some land do so using both cash and share leases.  On 
average, fifty percent of rented acres on these farms are under cash lease. 
14 I investigate this source of bias using the microfiles of the 1999 AELOS, which asked for detailed information about 
the type of lease arrangement, the total cash rent paid, and the value of the share of production paid as rent.  Using these 
data I construct an estimate of the non-classical measurement error, and I estimate the relationship between the 
measurement error and government payments.  Appendix table 2 reports the estimates.  The coefficient represents the 
potential bias.  With state fixed effects, the incidence estimate is 0.03 greater than the truth.  However, with county 
fixed effects, I find no relationship between government payments and the measurement error, implying no bias in the 
primary analysis.  Details of this analysis are available from the author upon request.   12
farm programs."  Producers are asked to report both total payments received and payments received 
from the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).
15  By subtracting CRP payments from the reported 
total payments, I construct an approximate measure of subsidy receipts.  In 1992, land-specific 
subsidies accounted for 70 percent of direct government payments net of Conservation Reserve 
Program payments.
16  Of the remaining 30 percent, 6.5 percent were price support payments and 
22.5 percent were from disaster relief and other programs (author’s calculations from administrative 
data).  In 1997, subsidies account for virtually all (96 percent) of non-CRP direct government 
payments (USDA, NASS, 2001a).  As reported in table 1, average subsidies per acre fell from 
$15.65 to $13.03 between 1992 and 1997.  Subsidies are measured per farmland acre.
17 
The remaining covariates employed below are sales revenue per acre, variable production 
expenditures per acre, the natural log of farm size, proportion of acres irrigated, proportion of acres 
in pasture, proportion of sales revenue in 19 product categories, and yields of the subsidized crops 
and soybeans.  These were constructed directly from variables contained in the Census of 
Agriculture. 
4   Empirical Strategy – Identification  
Here I lay out the obstacles that must be overcome to identify the effect of government 
subsidies on farmland rental rates.  First, unobserved productivity factors confound the subsidy-
rental rate relationship.  Second, expectation error attenuates the estimate.  After setting out a fixed-
effect estimation equation to address the first concern, I detail the instrumental variables procedure 
necessary to overcome attenuation bias in the econometric model.   
                                                 
15 The Conservation Reserve Program provides an annual “rental” payment for farmland that has been removed from 
production under 10-15 year contracts and upon which a long-term, resource-conserving cover crop has been 
established. 
16 I address possible measurement error-induced attenuation bias below using administrative data to instrument for the 
Census-reported subsidies. 
17 Analysis performed using log-levels produces very similar results.  The per-acre analysis is presented in order to 
maintain a more natural interpretation of the coefficient.   13
4.1 Unobserved  Heterogeneity 
The econometrician cannot observe many farm characteristics that influence both subsidies 
and farmland rental rates.  Among these are soil properties and farmer skill, which positively affect 
subsidies through the program yield parameter in equation (1). The positive correlation between 
government payments and the time-invariant unobserved factors that influence productivity will 
upwardly bias the estimated effect of subsidies on rental rates.  Transient shocks, such as drought or 
pests, also may affect rental rates and government subsidies.  Farm and time-varying county fixed 
effects address these sources of bias.   
The main estimation equation is 
(2)     rijt =α + git
*γ + ′  X  itβ + fi + C jt +εijt, 
where rijt is the average rental rate for farm i in county j and year t.  The per-acre subsidy expected 
by the farm operator in the spring, when rental contracts are negotiated, is g
*
it, and fi is the fixed 
effect for farm i.  The parameter Cjt is a time-varying county effect that allows for shocks, such as 
weather or pests, that impact all farms within the county.  Xit is a vector of observable covariates 
comprised of sales revenue, expenditure, production yield of the seven subsidized crops and 
soybeans, the share of sales revenue for 19 commodity groups, proportion of acres irrigated, 
proportion of acres in pasture, and farm size. 
  The estimating equation used in this study is obtained from equation (2) by first differencing 
the data to absorb the farm effect, resulting in 
(3)     Δrij =Δ g
i
*γ + Δ ′  X  iβ + ΔC j + Δεij. 
4.2   Expectation Error 
The remaining problem to be addressed is expectation error.  Rental rates are set in the 
spring according to expected receipts after harvest, including expected subsidy payments.     14
Expectation error causes attenuation bias.  Actual government payments will equal the expected 
government payment and an expectation error, 
 ( 4 )      
g
it it it g g ε + =
* . 
Assuming the expected subsidy and the expectation error are uncorrelated, i.e.Cov git
*,εis
g () = 0 ∀t,s, 
implies that substituting realized government payments, git, for the expected subsidies in equation 
(2) has the same effect as classical errors in variables, namely attenuation bias. 
The 1996 FAIR Act reduces the complexity of the problem by eliminating expectation error 
in 1997.  Recall that in 1996 the subsidy rates were exogenously predetermined for the next seven 
years.  Because of this feature of the legislation, in 1997 expected subsidies equaled actual 
subsidies,  97
*
97 i i g g = . 
Substituting for expected subsidies in equation (2) and first differencing results in 
( ′  3 )     Δrij =γ gi,97 − gi,92 ( )+ Δ ′  X  iβ +ΔC j + Δεij +εi,92
g γ. 
An instrumental variables strategy may overcome the attenuation bias induced by the 
expectation error.   Instruments that address the bias due to expectation error should be correlated 
with the deterministic component of the subsidy (program yield and base acres) and uncorrelated 
with the idiosyncratic component (the 1992 subsidy rate). As illustrated in equation (1), the 1997 
subsidy is a known, deterministic function of the underlying program parameters that also 
determined the 1992 subsidy.  Inasmuch as the farm-level program parameters remain unchanged 
between 1992 and 1997, the deterministic component of the 1997 subsidy level will be highly 
correlated with the deterministic component of the 1992-1997 subsidy change.  Thus the 1997 
subsidy level will be a good instrument if the subsidy shock in 1992 contained no information for 
the expected subsidy in 1997, a reasonable assumption.   15
5  Estimation and Results  
A.  Subsidy Incidence on the Landlord 
The approach taken by this paper has the advantage of controlling for unobserved 
characteristics of the farm, such as the operator’s entrepreneurial skill and the productivity of the 
land, that confound the subsidy’s effect.  I illustrate the insight gained from this approach by first 
ignoring the panel nature of the data.  As reported in the first column of table 2, bivariate regression 
of the rental rate on subsidies per acre obtained by pooling the 1992 and 1997 Censuses of 
Agriculture data yields an incidence estimate of 0.66.  The second column of table 2 reports that the 
incidence estimate falls to 0.44 when controls are included in the regression.  Even before 
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity there is evidence that the characteristics of the farmland 
rental market do not correspond with conventional wisdom.  Column 3 of table 2 reveals the effect 
of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by estimating equation (3).  The incidence estimate falls 
to 0.13, and it is statistically different from one.  In other words, 13 cents of the marginal subsidy 
dollar is reflected in higher rental rates.   
  Since the expectation error depicted in equation ( ′  3 ) attenuates the estimate, the fixed effects 
estimate may be too low.  I address possible attenuation bias by instrumenting for the subsidy 
change with the 1997 subsidy level.  As noted above, the permanent components of the subsidy will 
ensure correlation between the subsidy level and its change, and the surety of 1997 subsidy 
payments alleviates expectation error concerns regarding the instrument. 
  Table 2 column 4 reports the instrumented incidence estimate.  Appendix table 3 reports the 
results from the first stage.  A Shea’s partial R
2 of 0.22 and an F statistic of 7,575 demonstrate the 
statistical strength of the instrument.  After instrumenting for expectation error the incidence 
estimate increases to 0.21, indicating that landlords ultimately capture just 21 cents of the marginal   16
subsidy dollar. 
B.  Subsidy Incidence on the Tenant 
  Standard theory suggests that if the supply of variable inputs is perfectly elastic, the 
remaining 79 cents of the marginal subsidy dollar will accrue to the tenant.  I estimate the tenant’s 
incidence by replacing the rental rate in equation (3) with per-acre net returns, calculated as total 
revenue less variable costs divided by total farmland acres.  For the reasons listed above, namely 
unobserved heterogeneity and the substantial importance of local production shocks, the 
specification remains the same.  Since net returns are realized after the subsidy payment, 
expectation error is not a concern, and I do not instrument for the subsidy variable.  
The coefficient on government payments from this regression, reported in table 2 column 5, 
is 0.80 with a robust standard error equal to 0.059.  Recall that renters own about a third of the land 
they farm and consequently receive the entire subsidy dollar on those acres.  Accounting for this in 
the 0.80 net returns incidence implies that tenants receive about 70 cents of the marginal subsidy 
dollar on rented land.
18  In other words, nearly the entire subsidy dollar on a rented acre of land can 
be accounted for as either a 21-cent increase in the rental rate or a 70-cent increase in the tenant’s 
net returns. Accounting for nearly the entire subsidy dollar demonstrates that measurement error is 
an unlikely cause of the remarkably low rental rate incidence estimate.
19  Ultimately, the landlord 
and tenant share roughly a 25/75 split of the marginal subsidy dollar.  
5.2  The Heterogeneity of Subsidy Incidence across Regions and Farm Size 
Regions within the U.S. differ substantially in the crops grown and the predominant lease 
contract type.  Noting that each crop is subsidized separately, one might worry that the incidence 
                                                 
18 0.80 ≈ 0.33(1) + 0.67(0.70) 
19 I further investigate the role of measurement error using county-level administrative data obtained through a Freedom 
of Information Act request from the Farm Services Agency of the USDA.  Instrumenting for farm-level self-reported 
subsidies per acre with the county-average subsidy per acre from administrative data reveals a nearly identical rental 
rates incidence estimate of 0.22 (s.e. 0.099, clustered at the county level).   17
differs according to crop and subsidy regime.  Farm size might also influence the size of the 
incidence.  For instance, perhaps large farms are better able to negotiate for lower rental rates, and 
they are driving the relatively low incidence.   
I explore the robustness of the results by estimating the incidence separately for different 
regions
20 and different farm sizes.
21  The incidence appears very stable across resource regions and 
sales class.  The rental rate incidence point estimates for five of the nine resource regions lie 
between 0.16 and 0.48, while the rest are indistinguishable from zero.  Six of the nine net returns 
incidence estimates lie within 0.1 of the main estimate. When estimated across sales classes, the 
rental rate incidence estimates cluster around the main result, ranging from 0.06 to 0.32.  The 
tenants’ net returns incidence estimates range from 0.71 to 1.09, except for the statistically 
insignificant estimate in the lowest sales class. The uniformity of incidence estimates spatially and 
across firm size gives further confidence in a 25/75 incidence split.
22  
6   Further Evidence 
A.  Short-run Response: Emergency Legislation in 1998 and 1999 
  The surprisingly low rental rates incidence might result from landlords preemptively 
adjusting rental rates in anticipation of the 1996 policy change.  The emergency legislation passed 
in 1998 and 1999 provides a unique opportunity to observe the short run effect of unanticipated 
subsidies on farmland rental rates.  I investigate this using the 1999 AELOS, which contains 
financial information on a sample of 26,553 farms.  I create a dataset of the 1997-1999 change by 
merging these data with the 1997 Census of Agriculture.  I estimate equation (3’) using data from 
                                                 
20 The USDA has established 9 resource regions corresponding to predominant crop mix and farming practices. 
21 Following USDA classification, e.g., 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FarmStructure/Gallery/farmsbyconstantdollars.htm 
22 Details available in appendix tables 4 and 5.   18
the resulting 5,587 farms.
23 The 1999 AELOS provides data on total government payments.   
However, according to administrative data, in 1999 land subsidies accounted for only half of 
government payments.  I address this measurement error with a second instrument, derived from 
administrative data:  the county-level average subsidy per acre.  This IV strategy precludes the use 
of time-varying county effects in the estimation.  However, since rental rates are set prior to, and 
independently of, local shocks, the model may not be misspecified by omitting the time-varying 
county effect.  Table 3 reports the rental rate incidence estimate in the first column.  Accounting for 
the measurement error results in a rental rate incidence estimate of 0.34, higher than that found in 
the main analysis, but still statistically (and substantially) less than 1.  The second column of table 3 
reports the subsidy coefficient in the net returns regression.  Because of the importance of local 
production shocks in determining net returns, this specification continues to include time-varying 
county effects rather than use the county-level instrument to correct for measurement error.    At 
0.55, the estimated incidence on the tenant is similar to that found in the main analysis although 
somewhat attenuated, potentially due to measurement error.  
B.  Long-run Response: The Food Security Reform Act of 2002 
  Over time rental rates may adjust to more fully reflect the subsidy change.  To investigate 
this claim I focus on the period of policy stability following the 2002 FSRI Act, when subsidy 
policy remained relatively unchanged until 2008.  I estimate the long run subsidy incidence by 
connecting farms from the 1997 Census of Agriculture with their responses to the 2005 Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey (ARMS).  ARMS is a nationally representative survey of 15,000 – 
25,000 farm businesses and households conducted annually by the USDA.  Because the 2002 FSRI 
                                                 
23 Similar to the selection criteria used previously, the sample consists of all cash renting farms in 1999 that also cash 
rented in 1997 and grew subsidized crops or received subsidies in 1997.  The 1999 AELOS does not contain production 
data, thereby preventing product mix and yield controls and limiting the set of covariates to those explicitly reported in 
table 3.   19
Act was implemented in stages throughout 2002, I treat 1997 as the base year and use the 1997 
Census of Agriculture, rather than use the census data from 2002.  I examine the nine-year 
difference, with three full years following the implementation of the 2002 FSRI Act, using 2,972 
farms that meet the selection criteria, namely renting in both years and growing a program crop in 
the base year.  
  Columns 3-7 of table 3 report the results of this investigation.  In addition to the amount of 
land-specific subsidies, upon which this paper is focused, the ARMS data provide information on 
loan deficiency payments, a production subsidy that first received widespread use in 1998.  The first 
row of table 3 reveals the long-run incidence estimates corresponding to land-specific subsidies, 
while the second row controls for the effect of production subsidies.  Column 3 reports a rental rate 
incidence estimate of 0.14 from the fixed effects specification.  Instrumenting for potential 
measurement error with the county-level average subsidy, derived from administrative data, reveals 
an incidence estimate of 0.38, reported in column 4.  Because of the potentially increased influence 
of outliers in this smaller dataset, column 5 reports the results of a robust regression that uses Huber 
weights (1973) and biweights to limit the influence of outliers.  This specification demonstrates the 
influence of outliers on several covariates, e.g. the coefficient on variable costs changes sign and 
magnitude to more closely correspond to the estimate in the main analysis.  At 0.15, the land-
specific subsidy incidence estimate remains similar to the fixed effects specification in column 3.  
Columns 6 and 7 report the tenant’s incidence.  The fixed effects specification yields a statistically 
insignificant 1.13, while the robust regression estimate is 0.61. 
  The standard caveats of the efficacy of fixed effects in a long difference of dynamic 
businesses apply here.  Unobserved, time-varying heterogeneity remain unaccounted for.  In 
addition, the relatively small sample size, which diminishes by more than 20 percent when   20
including time-varying county effects due to single observations within a county, reduce the power 
to discern the incidence.  In spite of this, the incidence estimates in columns 3-7 suggests that the 
subsidy incidence does not substantively change in the medium to long-run.  
7 Potential  Explanations 
Conventional wisdom holds that competitive farmland markets enable landlords to extract 
the entire marginal subsidy dollar, resulting in perfect subsidy incidence on farmland.  The less than 
full subsidy incidence found here warrants reconsideration of the fundamental assumptions.  This 
section considers possible exceptions to the underlying assumptions of the farmland incidence 
model.  I examine the role of competition in the less-than-perfect incidence finding and suggest the 
possible role of social norms. 
Imperfectly competitive rental markets may play a role in these findings.  Although 
landlords potentially could receive the subsidy on unrented, idle land, without a tenant they would 
forgo the use-value of the land.
24  Landlords may have low reservation rents since agricultural land 
has few alternatives outside farming.  In a market with many landlords and few renters, the 
landlords may implicitly share the subsidy dollar in an attempt to attract tenants.  
To examine the hypothesis that rental market concentration affects the landlord’s ability to 
extract the subsidy, I interact the farm-level subsidy with a county-level rental market concentration 
measure and include it in the main specification.  I measure rental market concentration with two 
Herfindahl indices. One index defines market share over total county farmland rental expenditure.  
The other defines market share over the total number of rented farmland acres.  
  The Herfindahl indices reveal slight to moderate concentration that is increasing over time.  
The Herfindahl index with respect to rental expenditures increases from a mean (median) of 0.106 
                                                 
24 Prior to the 1996 FAIR Act landlords could not directly receive subsidies on idle, unrented land.   21
(0.058) in 1992 to 0.121 (0.068) in 1997.  The average (median) Herfindahl with respect to rented 
acres increases from 0.045 (0.018) to 0.046 (0.019).
25,26   
The effect of market concentration on rental rate incidence is reported in table 6.  Column 2 
reports how the incidence changes as rental market concentration varies.  A 0.01 increase in the 
expenditure Herfindahl causes the incidence to fall by 0.026, and a 0.01 increase in the acreage 
Herfindahl leads to a 0.19 drop in the incidence.  These estimates imply a 0.02-0.04 fall in the rental 
rate incidence due to average concentration growth between 1992 and 1997.  Column 1 reports the 
incidence as the market approaches perfect competition.  As measured by the expenditure 
Herfindahl, incidence approaches 0.3 as concentration goes to zero; incidence approaches 0.45 as 
concentration goes to zero when measured by the acreage Herfindahl.  Imperfectly competitive 
rental markets appear to play a role in the lower-than-expected rental rate incidence. 
The structure of rental contracts suggests that social norms also may play a role in the 
incidence estimate.
27  The long-term tenant-landlord relationships commonly observed facilitate the 
role of trust in the rental contract.  Trust may play an important role in overcoming the principal-
agent problem (Arrow, 1968), allowing the landlord to ensure the tenant provides wise stewardship 
of the land on threat of losing trust and the associated social capital.  A 25/75 subsidy split, in favor 
of the tenant, may in part underscore the value of trust and the cost of violating that trust.  Fairness 
also provides a possible explanation for these findings.
28  Similar to the findings from ultimatum 
games in the lab (Guth, 1982), landlords may “return” a positive amount of the subsidy to the tenant 
due to a sense of fairness. 
                                                 
25 In the analysis, where the Herfindahls are averaged over tenants rather than counties, the mean (median) of the 
expenditures Herfindahl increases from 0.035 (0.024) to 0.041 (0.029) and the acres Herfindahl increases from 0.014 
(0.008) to 0.015 (0.009) between 1992 and 1997. 
26 The U.S. Dept. of Justice classifies a market with a Herfindahl index below 0.1 as unconcentrated and between 0.1 
and 0.18 as moderately concentrated.  (http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horizon_book/15.html) 
27 Robison et al. (2001) provide evidence that social capital affects prices in the farmland market.  Young and Burke 
(2001) demonstrate the influence of custom in determining contracts in the farmland rental market. 
28 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possible explanation.   22
8 Conclusion 
This paper examines the proportion of the marginal subsidy dollar captured by farmland 
owners.  Using a nationally representative panel of farms to account for unobserved heterogeneity 
and exploiting exogenous subsidy variation caused by legislative changes to identify the effect of 
subsidies on rental rates and farmer net returns, the analysis demonstrates that landlords capture 
about one-fifth of the marginal subsidy dollar through higher rental rates.  Seventy of the remaining 
80 cents are accounted for in the tenant’s net returns.  The remaining 10 cents may be extracted by 
other input providers or may be lost due to measurement error.  The approximately 25/75 landlord-
tenant subsidy split holds across farm sizes and across regions in the U.S.  The same pattern holds 
immediately following a subsidy change and in the medium to long-run. 
  Ultimately, farm policy appears to accomplish its stated purpose to increase farmers’ 
income.   This effect occurs directly, rather than indirectly through increased asset values, thereby 
benefitting all farmers, tenants and owner-operators alike.  According to the 1996 Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey, 46 percent of subsidized acres are rented.  Considering that 94 
percent of landlords are not farmers, a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that only about 9 
percent of farmland subsidies leave the agricultural sector. 
This paper speaks more generally about the capitalization of location-specific policy effects 
into land values.  Standard economic theory predicts that location-specific policy effects are 
capitalized into land values through competitive land markets.  Relying on this theory, researchers 
have estimated the value of many non-market goods, e.g., the value of clean air (Greenstone and 
Chay, 2005) and health risks (Davis, 2004).  However, this paper’s findings suggest that the 
standard assumptions may not always apply.  Imperfect farmland rental markets play a role in the   23
low incidence of subsidies on landlords.  This finding needs to be explored in other settings through 
careful attention to institutional details and the competitive environment.   24
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